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FTC v. Actavis, Inc.: When Is the Rule of
Reason Not the Rule of Reason?
Thomas F. Cotter*
When is the lion neither inside nor outside the den?'
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in FTC v.
Actavis, Inc.2 brings some resolution to the decade-long dispute
over the level of antitrust scrutiny that is appropriate for
evaluating the legality of "reverse payment" or "pay-for-delay"
agreements settling pharmaceutical patent infringement
litigation between brand-name and generic drug companies. I
have written at length about this topic before and need not
devote time and space to rehashing the facts or the arguments
in favor of various proposed approaches. 3 Suffice to say that in
the past I argued against the Eleventh Circuit's "scope-of-the-
c 2014 Thomas F. Cotter
* Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. Whalen Lai, Koan, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 287, 288
(Oliver Leaman ed., 2001) (attributing the saying to Mazu Daeyi).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
3. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent
Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491 (2002); Thomas F. Cotter,
Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments:
Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent
Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069 (2004); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the
"Presumptive Illegality" Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving
Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1789 (2003) [hereinafter Cotter, Presumptive Illegality]; see also
Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: An Analysis, INTELLECTUALIP.COM (Feb.
25, 2013) http://intellectualip.com/2013/02/25/ftc-v-actavis-an-analysis/
[hereinafter Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: An Analysis]; Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v.
Actavis, Case Law, INTELLECTUALIPCOM (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://intellectualip.com/2013/02/22/ftc-v-actavis-case-law/ [hereinafter Cotter,
FTC v. Actavis, Case Law]; Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: The Hatch-
Waxman Framework, INTELLECTUALIP.COM (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://intellectualip.com/2013/02/20/ftc-v-actavis-the-hatch-waxman-
framework/; Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: Reverse Payments,
INTELLECTUALIP.COM (Feb. 21, 2013), http://intellectualip.com/2013/02/21/ftc-
v-actavis-reverse-payments/.
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patent" test, under which the agreement would be legal as long
as the terms fell within the exclusionary potential of the
patent, and the infringement action was not merely a sham or
fraud. 4 Instead, I argued for a "presumptive illegality"
approach, under which proof that a brand-name company paid
a generic company to settle would shift the burden to the
settling parties to rebut the presumption of illegality.5 In this
regard, I proposed that the most important factor in
determining whether the settling parties have rebutted the
presumption should be
the amount of consideration flowing from the brand-name to the
generic firm. Where that amount is less than the amount of the
patent owner's expected litigation costs, this fact alone may be
sufficient to rebut the presumption, and thus shift to the antitrust
plaintiff the burden of proving that the anticompetitive harm
outweighs the procompetitive benefit of the settlement. Under these
circumstances, the payment may represent nothing more than a
good-faith effort to avoid litigation costs . . . . Other relevant
evidence may include the presence of other agreements between the
settling parties (for example, authorizing the defendant to market
an authorized generic drug, or licensing the defendant other
intellectual property rights), which should be taken into account for
the limited purpose of accurately estimating the value of the
consideration flowing from plaintiff to defendant; whether the
generic is "cash-strapped," and therefore willing to accept a later
entry date to remain in business; whether the patent owner sought,
and succeeded in obtaining, a preliminary injunction against the
generic manufacturer; whether the generic manufacturer agrees to
waive its 180-day exclusivity, thus removing the risk of a bottleneck
potentially blocking other ANDA applicants; and whether the patent
in suit has withstood other validity challenges arising after the
filing of the settled action. On the other hand, where the amount of
consideration flowing from patent owner to generic manufacturer
exceeds the generic firm's expected profit from the sale of the
generic drug in question, the inference that the patent owner is
simply paying a potential competitor to exit the market is much
stronger, and the presumption of illegality should be very difficult to
rebut. Moreover, although it probably would not be advisable to
require the factfinder to estimate the ex ante probability that the
patent would have been found valid and infringed had the
infringement action not been settled a matter that courts in some
of the reverse payment cases understandably have been reluctant to
undertake-all that the proposed approach requires is for courts to
draw appropriate inferences from the amount of the settlement in
4. See Cotter, FTC v. Actavis, Case Law, supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 534-35.
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comparison to other expected costs and benefits, along with any
other relevant facts and circumstances. 6
Writing for a 5-3 majority in Actavis, Justice Breyer
rejected both the scope-of-the-patent test and the presumptive
illegality approach and held instead that courts should review
reverse payment settlements under the rule of reason.7 Or so
the opinion states. In reality, the Court appears to have all but
in name adopted the presumptive illegality approach it
purported to reject. One might speculate about the political or
prudential considerations that went into the majority's
characterization of what it was actually doing, but as I read the
opinion, reverse payment settlements of the type at issue in
Actavis are now subject to a de facto regime of presumptive
illegality. In my view, this is a welcome result.
The reason I characterize the majority holding as adopting
a de facto rule of presumptive illegality is that, as antitrust
lawyers are well aware, in practice the rule of reason is hardly
the sort of open-ended, totality-of-the-circumstances approach
suggested by Justice Brandeis's classic definition of the rule of
reason in the old Board of Trade case.8 Rather, courts tend to
apply a structured version of the rule of reason,9 which
Professor Hovenkamp nicely summarizes in his hornbook10 and
6. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: An Analysis, supra note 3 (citing MICHAEL A.
CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 378-82 (2009); Cotter,
Presumptive Illegality, supra note 3, at 1812-15).
7. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230-38 (2013).
8. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id.
9. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33-38 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 279 80 (4th ed. 2011).
2014] 43
MINN. J. L. SCL & TECH.
which I paraphrase in the following manner in my own
antitrust classes:
1. Consider first whether there is a "contract, combination, or
conspiracy" that restrains trade (in some sense).
If yes (conscious parallelism coupled with plus factors?), go on.
If not, § 1 doesn't apply (the "§ 1 gap").
2. If necessary, consider next whether the restraint poses any
possible risk to competition. I.e., is the restraint at issue one that
poses a substantial risk of increasing price, lowering quantity, or
causing some other anticompetitive harm?
If yes, go on.
If no, stop; judgment for defendant.
3. If necessary, consider next whether the restraint is likely to
generate any plausible, cognizable, procompetitive benefits.
For example, does the restraint plausibly relate to the core
activities of a lawful joint venture?
Is it plausibly ancillary in the sense of being reasonably
necessary to promote the legitimate activities of a joint
undertaking? Reasonably necessary for the provision of some
good or service that consumers demand but which might not be
provided optimally if each competitor merely followed its own
individual self-interest?
If yes, go on.
If no, stop; it is a naked restraint of trade, likely only to increase
price or reduce output or quality, and is per se illegal.
4. If necessary, consider next whether the defendant has market
power (e.g., through substantial market share coupled with barriers
to entry), or alternatively whether there is proof of actual
anticompetitive effects, such as a reduction of output.
If yes, go on.
If no, stop; judgment for defendant.
5. If necessary, consider next whether the restraint at issue
provides actual (not just plausible) procompetitive benefits.
If yes, go on.
If no, stop; judgment for plaintiff.
6. If necessary, consider next whether the restraint is the least
restrictive means of attaining those benefits.
If yes, go on.
If no, stop; judgment for plaintiff.
7. If necessary, balance the procompetitive benefits against the
anticompetitive costs (good luck!).11
11. Thomas F. Cotter, PowerPoint Presentation, Antitrust Overview
(unpublished document) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cotter PowerPoint];
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Assuming that this analysis is correct, what exactly will
courts be doing when they apply the rule of reason approach to
pay-for-delay cases such as Actavis? Will they be starting from
step 1 above? No, because in any case in which a patentee
agrees to pay money to an alleged infringer in return for the
latter's agreement to settle the case and temporarily exit the
market there is obviously a contract that potentially restrains
trade; that much is indisputable. Equally obvious is the
potential risk to competition (step 2). At the same time, there
are potential procompetitive benefits (step 3), because (as a
general matter) settlement conserves social resources that
otherwise would be devoted to litigation and (in this specific
context) in theory the settlement could speed up the entry of
generic drugs to the market. 12
Crucially, according to the majority, step 4 above is also
likely to be present in the context of pay-for-delay settlements.
As Justice Breyer wrote:
First, the specific restraint at issue has the "potential for
genuine adverse effects on competition." The payment in effect
amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell
its product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent
litigation were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not
infringed by the generic product. Suppose, for example, that the
exclusive right to sell produces $50 million in supracompetitive
profits per year for the patentee. And suppose further that the
patent has 10 more years to run. Continued litigation, if it results in
patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement, could cost the
patentee $500 million in lost revenues, a sum that then would flow
in large part to consumers in the form of lower prices.
Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least
sometimes prove unjustified . ...
Third, where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to
bring that harm about in practice. At least, the "size of the payment
from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself
a strong indicator of power"-namely, the power to charge prices
higher than the competitive level. An important patent itself helps
to assure such power. Neither is a firm without that power likely to
pay "large sums" to induce "others to stay out of its market." In any
see also Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust
Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1205-06 (2009).
12. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234-35.
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event, the Commission has referred to studies showing that reverse
payment agreements are associated with the presence of higher-
than-competitive profits-a strong indication of market power. 13
If we have made it all the way through steps 1 through 4,
what remains? Step 5 asks (in my formulation) "whether the
restraint at issue provides actual (not just plausible)
procompetitive benefits." 14 Importantly, the burden of proof on
step 5 normally rests with the defendant.15 So if, under the
Court's own analysis, steps 1 through 4 are satisfied in the
typical pay-for-delay case and review really kicks in at step 5-
at which point the defendant has the burden of coming forward
with exonerating evidence-it is a little hard to see how that
framework differs in any functional manner from presumptive
illegality. 16
13. Id. at 2234-36 (citations omitted).
14. See Cotter PowerPoint, supra note 11. Professor Hovenkamp states
this step somewhat more forcefully, namely whether there is "strong evidence
that the challenged practice creates substantial efficiencies by reducing
participants' costs or improving product or service quality." HOVENKAMP,
supra note 10, at 280.
15. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir.
2005) ('[T]he evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to show the restraint
in fact does not harm consumers or has 'procompetitive virtues' that outweigh
its burden upon consumers."); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056,
1065 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that "[o]nce the plaintiff meets the burden of
producing sufficient evidence of market power, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-
competitive objective"); Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56
(2d Cir. 1997) ("'[If the plaintiff succeeds [in showing an actual
anticompetitive effect], the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the
"pro-competitive 'redeeming virtues' of the action. Should the defendant carry
this burden, the plaintiff must then show that the same pro-competitive effect
could be achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of
competition."').
16. See Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 36. The Polygram court stated:
For reasons we have already explained, we reject PolyGram's
attempt to locate the appropriate analysis, and the concomitant
burden of proof, by reference to the vestigial line separating per se
analysis from the rule of reason. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law, 151la ("judges and litigants too often assume erroneously that
the classification, per se or rule of reason, necessarily determines
what must or may be alleged and proved, made the subject of detailed
findings, or submitted to the jury"). At bottom, the Sherman Act
requires the court to ascertain whether the challenged restraint
hinders competition; the Commission's framework, at least as the
Commission applied it in this case, does just that.
We therefore accept the Commission's analytical framework. If,
based upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is
obvious that a restraint of trade likely impairs competition, then the
46 [Vol. 15:1
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This is particularly so given the Court's further statements
that "it is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to
answer the antitrust question" and its discussion of the type of
procompetitive justifications that might excuse a reverse
payment.17 As for the first issue, Justice Breyer wrote:
An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally
suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent's
survival. And that fact, in turn, suggests that the payment's
objective is to maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared among
the patentee and the challenger rather than face what might have
been a competitive market-the very anticompetitive consequence
that underlies the claim of antitrust unlawfulness. The owner of a
particularly valuable patent might contend, of course, that even a
small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be that as it
may, the payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent
the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that consequence
constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm. In a word, the size of
the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate
for a patent's weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a
detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.18
In other words, the plaintiff is not going to have to prove,
except inferentially by reference to the amount of the payment,
that the probability of patent invalidity was high. As for the
second, the Court noted that reverse payments
may amount to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation
expenses saved through the settlement. That payment may reflect
compensation for other services that the generic has promised to
perform-such as distributing the patented item or helping to
develop a market for that item. There may be other justifications.
Where a reverse payment reflects traditional settlement
considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for
services, there is not the same concern that a patentee is using its
monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding
of noninfringement. In such cases, the parties may have provided for
a reverse payment without having sought or brought about the
anticompetitive consequences we mentioned above. 19
All of this leads me to conclude that the reasons the Court
chose not to characterize what it was doing as a presumptive
illegality approach were either (1) political, e.g., to keep one or
restraint is presumed unlawful and, in order to avoid liability, the
defendant must either identify some reason the restraint is unlikely
to harm consumers or identify some competitive benefit that
plausibly offsets the apparent or anticipated harm.
Id.
17. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
18. Id. at 2236-37.
19. Id. at 2236.
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more possibly gun-shy justices on board with the majority, on
the theory that a rule of reason approach is not quite as pro-
plaintiff as a presumptive illegality approach; or (2) based on
concerns that courts might construe the adoption of a
presumptive illegality approach in the present case as
effectively holding that such an approach is appropriate in
other cases, not arising in the byzantine shadow of Hatch-
Waxman. The concluding section of the majority opinion seems
to reflect this latter concern, 20 and thus may be viewed as a
20. See id. at 2237-38. Justice Breyer concluded:
[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive
effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor's
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any
other convincing justification. The existence and degree of any
anticompetitive consequence may also vary as among industries.
These complexities lead us to conclude that the FTC must prove its
case as in other rule-of-reason cases.
To say this is not to require the courts to insist, contrary to what
we have said, that the Commission need litigate the patent's validity,
empirically demonstrate the virtues or vices of the patent system,
present every possible supporting fact or refute every possible pro-
defense theory. As a leading antitrust scholar has pointed out,
"'[t]here is always something of a sliding scale in appraising
reasonableness,"' and as such "'the quality of proof required should
vary with the circumstances."'
As in other areas of law, trial courts can structure antitrust
litigation so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories
too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the other,
consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the
minimal light it may shed on the basic question-that of the presence
of significant unjustified anticompetitive consequences. We therefore
leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason
antitrust litigation.
Id. (citations omitted). I would expect that settlements of patent infringement
litigation outside of the Hatch-Waxman context will rarely give rise to
plausible antitrust claims under the rule of reason. In a typical case,
settlement may increase output (e.g., by resulting in a nonexclusive license of
a patent that has withstood a validity challenge), thus failing step 2 above; or
the patentee lacks market power (step 4); or courts will conclude, as a general
rule, that a settlement lacking any red flags such as the presence of a reverse
payment in excess of the defendant's expected profit (or other suspicious
conditions) necessarily has procompetitive benefits that outweigh any
anticompetitive consequences that could be proven without unraveling the
reduction of adjudicative costs that is the primary social good that settlement
produces (and thus will not countenance attempts to question patent validity
or infringement absent good reason). But I tend to agree with the majority
that patent settlements should not be effectively immune from antitrust
scrutiny absent conduct such as sham or fraud, which arguably was the
implication of the scope-of-the-patent test.
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rejoinder to the dissent's concern that the majority approach
renders vulnerable even conventional patent settlements. 21
In conclusion, it seems to me that the majority adopted a
(de facto) presumptive illegality approach to pay-for-delay
settlements entered into in the shadow of Hatch-Waxman-
precisely the approach that many of us were hoping for 22 -even
if, for political or prudential reasons, it suggests that it did not.
As long as the lower courts correctly interpret the message, this
seems an acceptable resolution to the pay-for-delay problem.
21. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2244-45 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
22. See Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business
Professors and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioners,
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2233 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 391001.
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